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I. THREE ACTIVITIES
Legal education exists at the confluence of three activities: the
practice of law, the enterprise of understanding that practice, and the
study of law's possible understandings within the context of a
university. The first of these, the practice of law, consists of the
activities consciously governed by law, including, for example, lawyers
giving legal advice, citizens contemplating the legality of prospective
actions, legislators creating law within the limits of their jurisdiction,
and judges determining the rights and duties of litigants. It thus
comprehends the entire field of legal institutions, legal doctrine, and
legal interaction. The second activity, the enterprise of understanding
law, refers to the elucidation of the character of this practice. This
enterprise seeks to determine the extent to which the practice's
various characteristics can be grasped as exhibiting, through the
coherence of their interrelationships, some generically determinate
character. The third activity, university study, requires that the
student's reflections about law be appropriate to an institution
devoted to caring for the intellectual inheritance-the stock of ideas,
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images, beliefs, skills and modes of thinking-that compose the
world's civilization.'
These three activities exercise a reciprocal effect on one
another. On the one hand, the practice of law supplies the materials
that are to be understood through university study. On the other
hand, that practice is transformed by the very enterprise of
articulating understandings of it. Scholars are not merely the passive
recipients of the law's materials. Rather, their understandings
influence the practice by making practitioners conscious of the
possibilities that are implicit in it.2 When these understandings
originate in the universities and are thus invested with the authority
of prestigious institutions of learning, the practice of law itself can
become either (at best) more aware of law's distinct voice in the
conversation of civilized humanity or (worse) more prone to succumb
to prevailing academic orthodoxies.
The central challenge that has faced legal education since it
was wrested from the legal profession and lodged in the universities 3
has been how to integrate the three activities. The relation between
the practice and the university study of law has proved particularly
problematic. One influential critique of legal education laments the
growing disjunction between them:
* University Professor and Cecil A. Wright Professor of Law, University of Toronto. I am
grateful to Ariel Porat for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, The Study of 'Politics' in a University: An Essay in
Appropriateness, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 184, 187-94 (new and
expanded ed., 1991) (1962). As will be apparent, Michael Oakeshott's work has significantly
influenced my remarks in this essay.
2. The classic statement of this is Friedrich Carl von Savigny's comments on the Roman
jurists:
[Tihe action of the jurists, appears at first sight a dependent one, receiving its
materials from without. However, by their giving to the materials so
presented a scientific form which strives to disclose and perfect the unity
dwelling in them, there arises a new organic life which shapes and reacts
upon the materials themselves, so that from science as such, a new sort of
generation of law incessantly proceeds.
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 37-38 (William Holloway
trans., 1867).
3. In Canada this happened relatively recently. The decisive event was the defection of
three of Canada's leading law professors (Cecil A. Wright, Bora Laskin, and John Willis) from
the law school operated by the Law Society of Upper Canada and their establishing the modern
Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto in 1949. Within a decade, the Law Society of Upper
Canada surrendered control of legal education to the universities by recognizing that graduation
from a university faculty of law qualified the graduate to enter the profession without penalty.
For a description of this "revolution" in Canadian legal education, see C. IAN KYER AND JEROME
E. BICKENBACH, THE FIERCEST DEBATE: CECIL A. WRIGHT, THE BENCHERS, AND LEGAL
EDUCATION IN ONTARIO 1923-1957 (1987). For a recent discussion, see R.C.B. Risk, My
Continuing Legal Education, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 313 (2005).
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The schools should be training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship that
judges, legislators, and practitioners can use.... But many law schools-especially the
so-called "elite" ones-have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract
theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy .... [11f law schools
continue to stray from their principal mission of professional scholarship and training,
the disjunction between legal education and the legal profession will grow and society
will be the worse for it.
4
Formulated in these terms, the critique forcefully indicates
what its author thinks is at stake. The practice of law and its
university study as currently constituted are regarded as competitors,
such that the university's preoccupation with "theory" operates "at the
expense of' practical professional concerns. The proper function of the
university study of law, according to this critique, is to produce
scholarly work for the professional consumption of those engaged in
the practice of law. The diagnosis, in effect, is that the practice of law
is effaced through university study, and the remedy suggested is that
the latter be recalled to its "principal mission" of being useful to the
former.
This criticism has, I think, a truth that should be recognized,
though my version of this truth is perhaps not what its author
intended. A disjunction between the practice of law and its university
study would indeed be disquieting. This is not, however, because the
disjunction would be a disservice to the legal profession (though it
might be), but rather because it would be a disservice to the university
itself.
The university exists as a locus for the study of law not for the
sake of the legal profession, but because law is a component of the
intellectual inheritance of civilization. The "principal mission" of
university study is to care for and develop this inheritance. That the
legal profession should benefit from this through the university's
graduates and its ideas is all to the good. Moreover, it is both desirable
and necessary that those who are most intimately connected with and
conscious of the workings of law should support its study within the
university-thus manifesting a commitment to the idea that law is
integral to civilized modes of thinking and living. But criticism of the
university study of law should come from a standpoint internal to
university activity itself. Accordingly, the disjunction between legal
education and the legal profession is troubling only if it represents a
failure on the university's own terms.
The disjunction would be such a failure in the following sense.
University study of any kind must have a definite object; it must be
4. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34, 41 (1992). Judge Edwards's views are extensively discussed
in Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921 (1993).
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the study of something. Law is a phenomenon that exists only through
a set of legal doctrines, institutions and juristic activities. The
university study of law can therefore be nothing other than the study
of the practice of law. Accordingly, legal education is inevitably
concerned with the activity of "judges, legislators, and practitioners,"
not in order to produce scholarship that they "can use" (though, if they
can legitimately use it, so much the better), but in order to reflect
upon the meaning and intelligibility of their activity. A disjunction
between the practice of law and the university study of law is
troubling because it suggests that the university study of law actually
has no object, that is, that it is the study of nothing, similar to the
zoological study of unicorns. Such study would be a failing from the
university's standpoint, quite apart from its uselessness to the legal
profession.
But what does it mean to say that the university study of law is
disjointed from the practice of law? The answer lies in how these two
activities conceptualize the character of law. If the university study of
law expressly or implicitly attributes to law a different character than
that which is presupposed in the practice of law, then one cannot say
that the practice of law is the object of university study. Under those
conditions, the practice of law and the university study of law would
be activities lacking a common interest; the law that the latter studied
would not be the same as the law that the former practiced.
Thus, the difference between the two activities of practice and
university study has to be mediated through the third activity, that of
understanding the law. For only when that understanding is common
to the law as practiced and as studied is there no disjunction between
legal education and the practice of law.
So formulated, the issue raised by the supposed disjunction
between the legal profession and legal education turns out to be
primarily one of legal theory rather than one of straightforward
sociological observation. Of course, what is discussed in a university
differs from what is discussed in a law office or a judges' conference.
What might link the two is a conception of how law is to be
understood. Those participating in university life as students,
teachers, and scholars regard law as a significant component of
civilization's intellectual inheritance and attempt to think through the
features implicit in the practice of law that make that practice worthy
of academic attention. The process of identifying these features and
thinking them through requires reference, implicitly or explicitly, to
some understanding of what the practice of law is. This is an exercise
in legal theory, because legal theory consists of nothing but a self-
conscious examination of the range of possible understandings of law.
And so the critic who blames the disjunction on too much "abstract
[Vol. 60:2:401
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theory" necessarily, if ironically, issues an appeal for further
theorizing.
In this Article, I wish to present more concretely this abstractly
formulated notion of disjunction. My focus is on the way that this
disjunction arises in the university study of private law. A justification
for this focus is that private law, as the enduring bedrock of legal
education, is a primary vehicle for the transmission of conceptions of
legal understanding. More importantly, the simplicity and the
restricted scope of the relationship between the parties allow the
disjunction and its implications to be set out with particular clarity.
Part II of this Article suggests that prevailing instrumentalist
approaches within the legal academy, exemplified by (but not confined
to) certain versions of the economic analysis of law, systemically
distort legal practice. This distortion effaces the characteristic
concepts of private law, ignores the direct relationship between the
parties, and assimilates private law into public law. In these respects,
economic analysis fails to comprehend private law as the distinctive
kind of normative phenomenon that it is.
My purpose in making these observations is not to criticize
economic analysis in particular, but to point to a structural problem
that accompanies an assumption-that law is to be explained
instrumentally-that is widely popular in the academic treatment of
law and that yet separates the university study of law from law's
practice. Economic analysis thus merely provides the paradigmatic
example of an instrumentalism that emerges from a distinctly
academic enterprise but that mischaracterizes the legal practice it
purports to explain. In Part III, I will sketch a different mode of legal
understanding that both respects legal practice and affirms private
law as a component of our intellectual inheritance that is worth
studying in its own terms. Finally, in Part IV, I will trace the
implications of this mode of understanding for the interdisciplinary
turn that is a conspicuous feature of contemporary legal education.
My goal in this Article is a modest one. It is easy to read
critiques of present legal education as exhortations to exclude, either
through curricular change or appointment policy, certain kinds of
currently entrenched enquiry. 5 My argument here, however, is not
about what to exclude but what to include. By exploring the supposed
disjunction between practice and university study, and by suggesting
how to overcome that disjunction, I want to point to a conception of
the core of legal education, at least for private law, that links the three
5. This is, for instance, the way Sandy Levinson reads Judge Edwards' critique as stated
in Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for a Bill of
Particulars, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2010 (1993).
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activities. This in no way denies the insights of other ways of thinking
about law. Inasmuch as they are about law, however, those insights
presuppose-and therefore are ancillary to-an understanding of law
that is not disjointed from the practice of law. Thus, my focus is on
what legal education should necessarily deal with, whatever else it
deals with.
II. DISJUNCTION: THE ROLE OF INSTRUMENTALIST ANALYSIS
A. The Example of Economic Analysis
To see the sort of disjunction that I have in mind, consider the
notion, popular among expositors of the economic analysis of law, that
economic efficiency is the key to understanding tort doctrine. The
basic assumption of this approach is that a defendant should be liable
for failing to guard against an accident only when the cost of
precautions is less than the probable cost of the accident. From the
economic standpoint, the goal of the liability rules of private law is to
provide incentives for cost-justified precautions. Ambitious claims
have been made on behalf of this mode of analysis: Economic ideas
have been said to reveal the inner nature, 6 implicit design, 7 and
unifying perspective8 for tort law.
This approach constitutes a notable attempt to link the
university study of law to the practice of law. On the one hand it
draws on the insights of economics, the academic discipline that
provides a systematic understanding of what Hegel called "the
infinitely complex criss-cross movements of reciprocal production and
exchange."9 On the other hand, it deploys this discipline to explain
leading doctrines in the practice of tort law. The vast academic
literature that this attention to economic efficiency has inspired is one
of the most impressive achievements of contemporary legal
scholarship.
One would have thought that an approach that purports to
reveal the inner nature of tort law would be particularly illuminating
about the concepts that pertain to tort law. Negligence liability, for
instance, involves a conjunction of legal concepts, such as duty,
proximate cause, factual cause, and the standard of reasonable care.
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 361 (1990).
7. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW vii
(1987).
8. RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (1982).
9. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 201 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford University
Press 1967) (1820).
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Such concepts are fundamental to our understanding of tort liability
because they structure the thinking of those who participate in the
practice. Through such concepts, tort law discloses its own normative
character, thereby indicating the terms in which it is to be understood.
Revealing the inner nature of such concepts would (one would expect)
disclose how they function or should function within the reasoning of
those engaged in legal practice. Among the issues that would then be
addressed are: What are the conditions that call each of these concepts
into play? How are they related to each other and do they form a
coherent set? What is the relationship between the abstract
formulations of these concepts and the institutional processes of
adjudication that particularize them for specific cases? And are these
concepts suitable vehicles for the normative considerations that justify
or can justify the determination of liability? Attention to these issues
would involve taking the concepts seriously as objects worth
explicating in their own terms, with a view to examining whether they
have or could have the significance that tort law ascribes to them
when it orients legal practice, as manifested in the reasoning of
lawyers and judges, along their lines.
In fact, economic analysis does the opposite. When economic
analysis is presented as the key to understanding tort law, the point of
the analysis is not to take the fundamental concepts seriously as
concepts used in legal practice, but to render them otiose. Economic
analysis has its own stock of ideas that operate without reference to
the legal concepts. The result is that ideas about economic efficiency
replace rather than illuminate the legal concepts. Instead of
functioning as vehicles of thought, the legal concepts are at most
labels pinned to conclusions once economic analysis has done all the
work.
Consider two instances, causation and intention. Causation
plays a central role in determinations of liability as a matter of legal
practice. For the economic analysis of tort law, however, causation
turns out to be an idea "that can largely be dispensed with."10 Given
that the purpose of tort law is thought to be the promotion of
efficiency, the defendant will be held liable-and thus deemed to be
the cause of an injury-when such liability will promote the efficient
allocation of resources to safety. Thus, cause does not mark the law's
concern for the transitivity of the relationship between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiffs injury, but functions merely as the label
that is attached to the conclusion of a cost-benefit analysis. Because
both parties might have taken precautions, the task for economic
analysis is to determine not whether the defendant caused the
10. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at 229.
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plaintiffs injury in the conventional legal sense, but which of them
could have avoided the accident more cheaply.
Similarly dispensable is the concept of intention.11 For the
economic analyst, intention refers not (as it does in the law itself) to
the actor's purpose'with reference to a wrongful consequence, but the
connection between the probability of harm and the ease with which
the actor could have avoided it. What "establishes a clear-cut economic
basis for condemning a distinct form of misconduct" is not the
wrongfulness of making another's injury the object of one's conduct
but instead the injurer's low cost of avoidance relative to the social
benefits of the injurer's activity. 12
The economic analysis, in other words, produces a disjunction
between the significance of tort concepts for legal practice and their
significance for academic study. While purporting to offer an account
of legal practice-indeed, while claiming to reveal its inner nature-
the economic approach instead effaces the very concepts that
constitute legal reasoning when determining liability within that
practice. In presenting its analysis of concepts like causation and
intent, the economic analyst aims not to illuminate those ideas in
their own terms, but to make them disappear in the face of the
analytic power of economic efficiency. Economic analysis thereby
offers a theory that negates rather than explains the concepts
supposedly being analysed. The deficiency of this form of scholarship
lies not in its presenting nothing about legal practice that "judges,
legislators, and practitioners can use,"1 3 but in its presenting nothing
about legal practice at all.
There is a second respect in which economic analysis does not
reflect legal practice. Through the process of litigation, the practice of
law directly links the particular plaintiff to the particular defendant.
Liability is thus a relational phenomenon in which the court responds
to the wrong or injustice that the defendant has done to the plaintiff.
This linkage assumes that the same reasons for liability apply
simultaneously to both parties. In contrast, economic analysis does not
treat the parties as directly connected. Rather, it views them each as
subject to different incentives that somehow happen to be conjoined in
a finding of liability. For economic analysis the point of liability is to
induce the parties to take cost-justified precautions. These incentives,
however, apply separately to each of them. Awarding damages against
a defendant provides defendants with an incentive to act efficiently,
"[b]ut that the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from the economic
11. Id.
12. Id. at 153.
13. Edwards, supra note 4, at 34.
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standpoint, a detail."14 The plaintiffs receipt of the damage award
reflects a different group of incentives (such as the need to induce
enforcement of the norm and to prevent prospective victims from pre-
empting the precautions incumbent on actors) 15 that do not in
themselves entail taking the money from the actual defendant. Both
parties are thereby involved in the damage award, but for separate
reasons. Efficiency might as easily be served by two different funds,
one that receives tort fines from inefficient actors, another that
disburses the indicated inducements to victims. Instead of linking
each party to the other, economic analysis ascribes the presence of
both as to a combination of incentives independently applicable to
each. Accordingly, liability is the consequence of one-sided
considerations that somehow come together, rather than of relational
considerations that treat the parties as belonging together because of
what the defendant has done to the plaintiff.
This sundering of the parties' relationship leads economic
analysis to mischaracterize private law in a third way. The
fundamental concepts that express the unity of the parties'
relationship make private law a distinctive mode of legal ordering,
with its own discourse, its own internal organization, and its own
normative presuppositions. Within the legal domain, the
distinctiveness of private law allows it to be contrasted to public law.
Private law normatively connects the parties directly to each other,
not to the state. Although the state is present through the machinery
of adjudication, the purpose of this machinery is merely to give
authoritative expression to what the relationship between the parties
requires. In contrast, public law is concerned with the forms and
limits of the state's exercise of power with respect to those who are
subject to it. Whereas private law deals with the relationships
between participants in the community, public law deals with the
relationships between participants and the community as emb died in
its official organs.
By denying the significance of fundamental concepts private
law and negating the unity of the defendant-plaintiff relationship,
economic analysis divests private law of the possibility of constituting
a distinctive mode of legal ordering. From the economic standpoint,
private law is to be understood as a judicially created and enforced
regime for the taxation and regulation of inefficient activity. 16 Courts
act as administrative tribunals that set norms for efficient behavior
14. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in
original).
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192 (6th ed. 2003).
16. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 48-49, 51 (1972).
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and exact fines when those norms are breached. The plaintiffs
function in initiating a lawsuit is not to secure redress for wrongful
injury but to claim a bounty for prosecuting inefficient economic
activity. Economic analysis thus submerges the private nature of tort
law in a public law of economic regulation.
Thus, the link that economic analysis posits between academic
study and the practice of private law is vitiated by its mistaken
characterization of that practice. Instead of illuminating private law,
economic analysis discards its fundamental concepts, breaks apart its
relationships, and subverts its private nature. The economic analysts
are not so much concerned with understanding private law as with
assessing the degree to which its rules coincide with what efficiency
demands. Far from being the focus of their attention, private law is
merely the foreign language into which economic discourse has
somehow been translated.17 The result is a profound disjunction
between the economic analysis of law as a method of university study
and the practice that is being studied."1
B. The Dynamic of Instrumentalism
My point in making these comments is not to criticize economic
analysis in particular. Rather, in contemporary legal education,
economic analysis is paradigmatic of the instrumentalist structure of
academic enquiry. What occasions the disjunction with legal practice
is this instrumentalist structure, not economic analysis as such.
Economic analysis is nothing but an instance of a more comprehensive
dynamic.
The instrumentalism of economic analysis consists in the
interpretation of tort law as forwarding the goal of economic efficiency.
As the disjunction just described indicates, the normative
attractiveness of this goal-what makes it worthy of being considered
a goal that tort law should forward-does not arise out of the law
itself, by reflection, for instance on the fundamental concepts of tort
law or on the nature of the relationship between the parties. Rather,
17. For law as the translation of economic principle, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 7, at
23; POSNER, supra note 6, at 361.
18. Economic analysis may lodge itself within the practice through the influence of
economic scholarship on judges, who then apply it in their judgments. Compare the observations
of von Savigny, supra note 2. To the extent that this occurs, the disjunction between academic
study and legal practice is lessened. However, in its stead a different and ultimately more
serious problem arises. Because economic analysis cannot coherently reflect the character of the
law, its entry into legal practice sets up irresolvable tensions between the law's fundamental
concepts and relational structure, on the one hand, and the economic analysis on the other. Thus,
the disjunction between academic study and legal practice is displaced by a disjunction internal
to the legal practice, between the economic analysis and the practice's concepts and structure.
410 [Vol. 60:2:401
CAN LAW SURVIVE LEGAL EDUCATION?
this goal thought to be desirable independently of tort law and is then
given to tort law from the outside. Tort law is only an instrument in
the goal's promotion.
Economic efficiency is merely one of the goals that modern
scholarship has proposed. These goals come in many varieties, ranging
from the general, such as promoting communal responsibility 19 or
basic aspects of the good 20 to the more specific, such as alleviating
injury. 21 All such goals base their appeal on some conception of human
welfare that is considered desirable independently of the law and that
the law should therefore strive to forward.
A consequence of focussing on independently desirable goals is
that private law is only indirectly implicated in the instrumentalist
inquiry. The instrumentalist starts by looking past private law to a
catalogue of favored social goals. Private law matters only to the
extent that it forwards or frustrates these goals. What the
instrumentalist proposes is not so much an understanding of private
law as an understanding of social goals. The disjunction of legal
education from legal practice is simply the difference between these
two projects in understanding.
Regardless of the goal it advances, an instrumentalist analysis
of private law mischaracterizes its object in the same way that
economic analysis does. An instrumentalist approach makes three
errors. First, it imports outside goals for immanent concepts of private
law. Second, it ignores the relationship between a plaintiff and a
defendant. Third, it wrongly converts all private law into public law.
Instrumentalist approaches substitute for the concepts of
private law the outside notions that are appropriate for the promotion
of the preferred goal. Instead of working out the meaning of the
applicable legal concepts in particular situations, as legal practice
requires, the instrumentalist specifies the mechanisms through which
the social goal might be forwarded in different circumstances. Because
the really important work is done by the apparatus of instrumental
reasoning, the law's invocation of the standard legal concepts is
regarded as a mere ritual,22 a veil to be pierced by clear-headed
19. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1480-1502 (1986).
20. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-75 (1979).
21. Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 785-88 (1967).
22. Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 653 (1931).
2007]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
analysis, 23 or even as a salutary obfuscation that itself has
instrumental value.
24
Second, within instrumentalist analysis the plaintiff and
defendant are not directly related to each other, because no
independently desirable goal is congruent with such a relationship.
The goals are considered elements of the social good, and therefore are
concerned with the overall benefit, however construed, to society as a
whole, not with the relationship between two particular parties.
Instead of linking the plaintiff to the defendant who has wronged her,
instrumentalist analysis groups each party with those who are, from
the standpoint of the goal in question, similarly situated. For example,
the alleviation of injury, when considered as a goal of tort law,
connects the injured party not to the particular person who has
wrongfully caused the injury, but to other injured persons who have a
like claim on the distribution of society's resources. Analysis in terms
of a goal thus breaks apart the relationship between the parties, in
order to apply the appropriate goal to each of them. The result is that
reading an independently desirable goal back into private law creates
a dissonance between the parties' nexus as a matter of legal practice
and the goal's indifference to this nexus within the instrumentalist
understanding of law. When university study accepts the
instrumentalist understanding and develops it, this dissonance
appears as a disjunction between university study and legal practice.
Third, for the instrumentalist, all law is public law. The
favored goals must be selected by the state and inscribed into a
schedule of collectively approved aims. The various method of
elaborating the community's purposes-adjudication, legislation,
administrative regulation, and so on-are merely the species of the
generically single activity of making the goals a legal reality. The
singling out of a particular goal from among all the possible goals, the
balancing of one goal against competing goals, and the positing of the
means for promoting the chosen goals require legislation by political
authority. Norms of private law are therefore considered the product
of legislative acts, even when formulated through the adjudicative
process. 25 Instrumentalism thereby dissolves the very idea of private
law as a distinctive mode of legal ordering. Private law turns out to be
nothing but public law in disguise. 26
23. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 809-12 (1935).
24. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 107 (1975).
25. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894).
26. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959).
[Vol. 60:2:401
CAN LAW SURVIVE LEGAL EDUCATION?
These three features of instrumentalist analysis are intimately
connected. The legal concepts (such as causation and intent) are the
apparatus that the law has elaborated to treat the relationship
between the parties as a single normative unit. The process of
determining a defendant's liability by working through these concepts
is what stamps private law as a distinctive kind of normative
ordering. The concepts, the relational unity, and distinctiveness of its
form of legal ordering are thus the mutually entailed aspects of
private law as a legal practice. Instrumental analysis distances itself
from all of these when it distances itself from any of them.
To the extent that contemporary legal education revolves
around instrumental understandings, it inevitably separates itself
from private law as a legal practice. Economic analysis is simply
exemplary in this respect. Those who, out of skepticism about or
antagonism toward economic efficiency as a goal, think that legal
education should center on different goals, contribute to this
disjunction no less than do the economic analysts themselves. The
disjunction is the consequence not of one particular goal or set of goals
rather than another, but of the very orientation toward goals.
In the face of this disjunction between the instrumentalist
understanding and the legal practice, two responses are tempting.
Each of these responses leaves the disjunction intact, while
submerging one or the other of the disjoined activities.
The first response is embodied in academic work that expressly
disconnects the university study of law from legal practice. In private
law this work takes the form of "decoupling" the position of the
plaintiff from that of the defendant. One suggestion, for example, is
that the defendant should pay more and the plaintiff should receive
less than the compensatory amount, with the difference going to cover
the state's administrative costs. 27 Another example is the suggestion
that efficient incentives would be best achieved by arranging that
contract damages be awarded to a third party rather than to the
victim of the breach.28 Such decoupling embraces the disjunction by
foregoing the aspiration to see the university study of law as an
endeavor to understand the practice of law. In terms of
instrumentalist scholarship, proposals of this sort represent an
advance over the more traditional project of explaining the law. They
are based on the recognition that the relationship between the parties
constricts the free play of instrumentalist reasoning. Once one
unravels the parties' relationship, the limits of legal scholarship are
27. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for
Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 562 (1991).
28. Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 204 (2002).
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set not by the law as an object of the enquiry, but by the imagination,
ingenuity and brilliance-all amply present-of the scholars
themselves. This allows a more consistent presentation of the kind of
instrumentalism favored by the particular scholar. But there is also a
parallel disadvantage. Having severed the link to legal practice, these
proposals seem to be nothing more than dreamy exercises in
instrumentalist utopianism, far removed from the hard-headed
contact with the real world that instrumentalists like to profess.
The second response goes in the opposite direction by
emphasizing the primacy of legal practice. This response is
exemplified in the call, mentioned earlier, for university study to
adhere to its "principal mission" of professional training by producing
scholarship that can be used by legal practitioners. 29 Offered in the
name of overcoming the disjunction between legal practice and
university study, the suggestion merely subordinates the latter to the
former, raising the question of why this "mission" would require
university study at all rather than a more direct system of
professional training and apprenticeship. After all, on this conception,
what are law professors except legal practitioners with more leisure
and lower salaries? By connecting the university study of law with the
demands of legal practice rather than with the purposes of the
university, the suggestion dismisses the significance of any
understanding of law that is not coterminous with legal practice itself.
In effect, the university study of law is regarded merely as a parasite
on the practice of law.
These two responses are the consequence of viewing law in
instrumentalist terms. Instead of attempting to overcome the
disjunction between university study and legal practice that
instrumentalism creates, the responses cut the Gordian knot by
accentuating one element and disregarding the other. The decoupling
view has a strong notion of the university study of law, which,
however, turns out to be not about law but about the possible artifacts
of instrumental reasoning. In contrast, the parasitic view is attentive
to legal practice but, given the open-endedness of instrumentalist
analysis, sees little value in university study beyond what can be used
by legal practitioners. In their separate ways each responds to the
problem of disjunction by giving up on it.
29. Edwards, supra note 4, at 41.
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III. OVERCOMING THE DISJUNCTION
A. The Character of Private Law
In this Part I want to sketch a possible solution to the problem
of disjunction. In the previous Part I argued that, so far as private law
is concerned, the disjunction between the university study of law and
the practice of law is a consequence of the instrumentalist framework
that dominates contemporary legal studies. The instrumentalist
framework subjects private law to analyses that inevitably
mischaracterize it. Instrumentalist approaches efface the concepts of
private law, fail to connect the parties directly to each other, and
assimilate private law to public law. Accordingly, a solution to the
problem of disjunction involves rethinking the assumptions that
create it.
Two mutually reinforcing moves are involved. Negatively, the
instrumentalist framework is to be rejected, since it is the infelicity of
this framework that generates the problem to begin with. Positively,
the organizing concepts of private law, the direct relationship between
the parties and the distinctiveness of private law as a mode of legal
ordering must be understood as the indicia of the specific character of
private law. The primary task of the university study of private law-
what it should do, whatever else it does-is to enquire into this
character. By so doing, university study both maintains its continuity
with the legal practice, which is its starting point, and yet goes beyond
that practice to disclose its implicit structural and normative ideas.
Central to the elucidation of the character of private law is the
assumption that private law is (or at least aspires to be) a normatively
coherent practice that can accordingly yield a coherent understanding.
Under this assumption the organizing concepts of private law are
harmoniously connected both to one another and to the institutional
structure of private law litigation. This assumption is a necessary
starting point for several reasons. First, only on the assumption of the
coherence of legal practice can one make sense of the endeavour to
regard private law as a systematically intelligible body of knowledge
that can be amenable to university study. Otherwise, private law
would be assumed to be nothing but a piled aggregate of propositions
that together had no specifiable character. Second, coherence is an
internal value and aspiration of the private law itself, being integral
to its reasoning and discourse. Thus, the assumption of coherence is
not only a methodological postulate of university study but also a
pervasive premise of legal practice and therefore itself part of the
character of the practice. Third, the practice of private law is a
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normative phenomenon, where the disposition of one person's claim
against another has to be justified through the use of public reason.
The process of justification presupposes that the private law's entire
apparatus of justification is internally coherent, for if elements of that
apparatus pulled in different directions, then it could not function to
justify anything.
The character of private law provides the general framework
for understanding it as a coherent normative phenomenon.
Specification of this character arises by a process of scholarly
reflection on, and generalization from, the law's particular
arrangements (its doctrines, its institutional structure, its ensemble of
concepts, its methods of reasoning, and so on). However, the character
of private law is not composed simply of the sum total of these
arrangements. Some of these arrangements may achieve that
character only imperfectly or deficiently, because they may not accord
with the practice viewed as a coherent whole. Whether the positive
law's treatment of a particular problem bears out the assumption of
coherence is a contingent matter. Where it does not, the character of
private law then provides the standpoint, internal to private law as a
whole, from which to criticize the particular legal arrangement.
Character is thus an ideal construct that makes the particulars of the
practice of private law intelligible in the light of the practice's most
general and pervasive features. Understood in terms of its character,
private law is "a unity of particularity and genericity. 3 °
The task of specifying the character of private law belongs to
the university study of law, but it is rooted in legal practice. Unless
university study takes legal practice seriously, the enquiry into its
character would, of course, be self-stultifying. No disjunction exists
between the character and the practice of private law. Even when
some particular arrangement of private law is thought to be deficient
in the light of the law's character, the criticism that emerges is
consonant with the law's self-critical commitment to "work itself
pure,"31 because it expresses the law's own striving for internal
coherence. The character of private law is implicit in its practice, but
scholarly reflection brings it into focus, defines and refines it, and
presents legal doctrine as its expression. Indeed, any treatment of
private law, whether in the classroom or in the academic literature,
that focuses on the requirements of coherence helps elucidate the
character of private law.
30. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 5 (1975).
31. Lord Mansfield's famous phrase in Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23
(K.B.).
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The most ambitious efforts to specify the character of private
law are necessarily exercises in "abstract theory."32 The theorist
strives to render what is implicit in the law as explicit as possible. To
do this one must have recourse not only to legal material but also to
conceptualizations, to the philosophical literature, and to modes of
discourse and analysis that, while treating the practice of law
seriously in its own terms, are not themselves part of that practice.
This exercise in theorizing has to be abstract, in that it abstracts from
the brute particularities of legal practice to the more general
standpoint inherent in the specification of the law's character. One
might even say that the more abstract the better, because the goal is
to formulate the most general framework possible. However,
throughout this project of specifying the character of private law,
continuity with legal practice is always maintained, because otherwise
the character specified would not be the character of anything. In this
context, abstract theory is the friend of legal practice, not its
competitor.
B. The Stages of Elucidation
The elucidation of the character of private law has three
stages: attending to the legal practice, eliciting its inner structure, and
enquiring into that structure's normative presuppositions.3 3
The first stage, attending to the legal practice, anchors the
elucidation of the law's character in the practice's features. As is
evidenced by the operations of those who engage in it with a mastery
of its concepts and procedures, the practice of private law is, at least to
some extent, an intelligible activity. Disclosure of the character of
private law is intended to render what is incipiently intelligible about
private law even more intelligible. This exercise requires that one take
notice of the justificatory and institutional apparatus of private law,
so that its features are the subject and the starting point for a more
general account.
Although the character of private law is an ideal construct, its
elucidation does not involve the imagining of a utopia. The practice of
private law is taken as the given object of enquiry, and it is viewed as
it views itself: as a specific kind of normative order that governs
human interactions according to its own distinctive yet coherent
conceptions of fairness and rationality. Subject to confirmation at
subsequent stages, the arrangements of private law can provisionally
32. Edwards, supra note 4, at 34.
33. See OAKESHOTT, supra note 30, at 1-31 (presenting Oakeshott's suggestive account of
the engagement of understanding).
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be regarded as the indicia, however indistinct, incomplete, or
inadequately articulated, of the kind of normative order that they
constitute. The task is not to excogitate a new and perhaps even
superior kind of normative order, but to disclose the character of this
one.
Of especial significance are the concepts of private law and the
institutional linkage of the parties as plaintiff and defendant. Because
elucidating the character of private law involves specifying the most
general framework for understanding it, particular attention should
be paid to aspects of private law that are already general. Every
application of private law presupposes a legal institution that directly
links a particular plaintiff and a particular defendant. Of course, one
can have a normative order in which this linkage is absent, for
example, where injury is dealt with by payment from a state fund;
whatever its merits, such a normative order is not a form of private
law. Also general, but having a scope that is more local, are the
concepts of private law. These are the ideas through which the law
requires us to organize our thinking about issues of liability. In
specifying the character of private law, we do not seek, as does the
instrumentalist, to show that these concepts are otiose, but to
understand their role within a coherent conception of liability. Do
these concepts, and other determinants of liability, sustain private
law's claim to an internally coherent rationality, or must they be
adjusted, abandoned or supplemented for the sake of that rationality?
To deal with these questions we must move to a second stage in
the elucidation of the character of private law. The second stage seeks
to bring out the inner structure of the arrangements of private law.
Because we are treating private law as a normative phenomenon, our
particular interest is in the structure of the considerations that justify
liability. The legal concepts and the other determinants of liability are
the vehicles for these considerations. The second stage inquires
whether these considerations have a uniform general shape. For if
they do, that shape would reveal the character of the law in which
these considerations are decisive.
Crucial to the disclosure of this structure is the institutional
nexus between plaintiff and defendant. Private law works through an
adjudicative mechanism by which the plaintiff sues the defendant
and, if successful, is given an award of damages or other relief that the
defendant must satisfy. As just noted, this direct linkage between
plaintiff and defendant is the most pervasive feature of private law. If
private law is to be understood as a normatively coherent practice, the
justification for liability in any particular case has to reflect the
structure of this linkage. The institutional framework for the litigation
attests to the fact that the point of liability is to remedy an injustice
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between the particular parties. Accordingly, the reason for considering
the defendant to have done an injustice to plaintiff can be coherent
only if it evinces the same direct link as is present in the institutional
framework. Justification within private law is thus the expression of a
bipolar normativeness that directly links the particular parties within
this institutional framework.
The structure of this bipolar normativeness is one of
correlativity, as is evident from the very nature of liability. The
determination of liability is a judgement that the defendant and the
plaintiff are mutually related as the doer and sufferer, respectively, of
the same injustice. To say that the defendant has been found liable to
the plaintiff is not to point to two separate injustices, one committed
by the defendant and the other suffered by the plaintiff. Rather, it is
to say that the parties have interacted in and through a single
injustice that the defendant has done to the plaintiff. Within this
correlatively structured injustice the defendant occupies the active
and the plaintiff the passive pole. The finding of liability maintains
this correlative structure but reverses the poles, so that the plaintiff is
now entitled to demand, and the defendant obligated to satisfy, the
remedy that repairs the injustice.
As the most general description of the structure of the parties'
interaction, correlativity marks the character of private law as a
distinctive normative order. No justification that does not participate
in this character can find a coherent place within private law.
Correlativity accordingly excludes considerations, no matter how
appealing, that focus unilaterally on one or the other of the parties (for
example, the depth of the defendant's pocket or the plaintiffs
insurability against injury). Such one-sidedness was the defect, noted
in the previous section, of instrumentalist approaches, which break
apart the relationship between the parties by invoking social goals
that operate on one or the other of them and on persons who are
similarly situated.
To the extent that they are coherent, the legal concepts
relevant to any particular basis of liability also partake of this
correlativity. Such concepts are the markers of a framework of
normative reasoning that operates relationally to connect two
particular parties as the doer and the sufferer of an injustice.
Moreover, such concepts are fair to both parties because they look to
the relationship between them rather than to the position of either
party considered in isolation from the other. Although the idea of
correlativity is an abstractly theoretical construct of scholarship and
not an explicit component of the practice of private law, it nonetheless
informs the concepts that expressly are components of that practice.
This is the consequence of the conjunction of private law's internal
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striving for coherence and correlativity's being the abstract
representation of that coherence. The role of the concepts is to
entrench the correlativity of the parties' situation into the reasoning
and discourse of private law. The doing and the suffering of the same
injustice is a single normative sequence that preserves its unity while
moving from one party to the other. The legal concepts pertaining to
each type of injustice are the devices through which legal practice
presents and integrates the moments of that sequence.
Negligence law provides an instance of how this works.3 4 The
sequence begins with the defendant's creation of an unreasonable risk,
which the law handles through the concept of breach of the standard
of reasonable care. The sequence ends with the materialization of risk
into injury to the plaintiff, which the law handles through concept of
factual causation. The two termini of this sequence are linked by the
concepts of duty and proximate cause, which keep the plaintiff and the
plaintiffs injury, respectively, within the risk by reason of which the
defendant's action is negligent. Duty and proximate cause are thus
integrating concepts that ensure that the risk that materialized in the
plaintiffs injury is the same as the risk that the defendant
unreasonably created. In this way the concepts form an ensemble that
gives legal expression to the parties' correlative situation with respect
to the injustice of unreasonable risk creation.
This treatment of legal concepts can be readily contrasted with
that of economic analysis. Recall the examples of causation and
intention mentioned in Part II. Under the economic approach, factual
causation is largely dispensable, to be replaced by a cost-benefit
analysis. In contrast, when understood as a feature of tort law's
character, factual causation is simply what it purports to be: the
concept that deals with the materialization of risk into actual injury.
A similar observation can be made about intention. Instead of being
twisted (as economic analysis suggests) into a reference to the
connection between the high probability of harm and the ease of
avoidance, intention is, again, just what it purports to be: the concept
that makes the execution of the defendant's purpose the link between
the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's conduct. Both causation and
intention are concepts that belong to private law's bipolar
normativeness. Each of them has a single normative significance for
both parties, and each is an element in an integrated sequence that
directly connects what the defendant has wrongly done to what the
plaintiff has wrongly suffered. Whereas economic analysis, having
pulled the parties apart, is unable to take seriously the legal concepts
34. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Disintegration of Duty, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 143 (M. Stuart
Madden ed., 2005).
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that normatively link them, the endeavor to specify the law's
character allows these concepts to be understood in their own terms
and to play a coherent role in the determination of liability.
The idea of correlativity illuminates not only the connection
between concepts but also the substantive ingredients of liability. If
the legal practice is to be understood as a coherent phenomenon, every
normative aspect of the parties' relationship has to be understood
under the notion of correlativity. As a general organizing feature of
liability, correlativity requires the mind to adopt and maintain a
special posture, or to be shifted, as it were, into a special normative
gear,35 to which every aspect of liability must conform. So far as its
normative structure is concerned, the private law relationship is
correlative all the way down.
The full significance of this is sometimes missed. Consider the
notion that the plaintiffs "protected interest," by which is meant some
significant aspect of the plaintiffs well-being, is a sufficient reason for
holding the defendant to be under a duty. This is misleading. Within
private law's correlative structure of reasoning, the plaintiffs well-
being as such cannot justify a private law duty, because well-being
refers to something about the plaintiff without having correlative
significance for the defendant. Private law recognizes this when it
refuses to impose an obligation to rescue even when the most
significant aspect of another's well-being, his or her life, is
endangered. For a correlative duty to be generated, well-being has to
be the embodiment of some right of the plaintiff. A right differs from
well-being as such in that a right is an intrinsically relational idea
that immediately signifies the existence of a duty correlative to it.
Well-being, in contrast, is a unilateral matter that bears on the person
whose well-being is at stake without correlatively implicating any
other particular person. Of course, the plaintiffs right might have the
effect of safeguarding aspects of well-being, but what accounts for the
correlative duty is the presence of the right, not the importance of the
well-being. 36
In this understanding of private law, rights are justificatory,
not conclusory. Just as correlativity structures the justifications for
liability generally, so rights, being inherently correlative, justify
imposing liability on defendants who have breached their correlative
obligations. A right is not a label attached to the conclusion of an
35. The metaphors of posture and gear are adopted from the illuminating discussion of
correlativity by Michael Thompson, What is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice, in
REASON AND VALUE 333, 346 (R. J. Wallace et al eds., 2004).




argument that justifies liability on the basis of one-sided
considerations; no combination of one-sided considerations can
produce a correlatively-structured justification. Rather, the plaintiffs
right is integral to the reasoning that justifies the defendant's
liability. This is not to say, of course that the plaintiffs right has to be
defined afresh in every case; within an established system of law
rights to such things as property, personal integrity, and contractual
performance are taken for granted. But however the rights gain their
validity, they are ingredients in the justification for liability, not labels
attached once liability is determined on other grounds.
Accordingly, the injustice that triggers liability is an
inconsistency with the plaintiffs right that is imputable to the
defendant. This inconsistency may arise in a variety of ways, such as
through the defendant's commission of a tort, violation of a contract,
breach of a fiduciary obligation, or the retention of a benefit that is
rightfully the plaintiffs under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Correlativity then requires that the legal concepts through which
liability is worked out give expression both to the existence of the
plaintiffs right and to an injustice correlative to that right. If the
injustice imputable to the defendant is not correlative to the plaintiffs
right (for example, if the defendant is negligent toward A but injures
B),3 7 no liability arises.
Understood in terms of the correlativity of the parties'
positions, private law is a system of rights and of the duties
correlative to them. Such an understanding maintains continuity with
the practice of law. Both the understanding and the practice treat
rights seriously, not as superfluous proxies for instrumentalist
considerations, but as genuinely normative determinants of liability.
But, one might ask, what exactly. are these rights, where do
they "come from," how are they distinguished from aspects of human
well-being, and how is their normative character to be understood?
Such questions point to a third stage in the understanding of private
law. This stage builds on the other two, the attention to legal practice
and the specification of correlativity as the most general structuring
idea immanent in that practice. At the third stage one enquires into
the normative presuppositions of correlativity and of the notion of
rights that emerges from it.
In structuring the interaction between doer and sufferer,
correlativity presupposes an abstract conception of the interacting
parties. Within this conception the parties are viewed as exercising
the capacity for purposive action, whatever might be their particular
purposes. No particular purpose, no matter how morally laudable (for
37. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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example, rescuing another from mortal danger), is normatively
necessary. Similarly, the resources that are available for the
realization of anyone's particular purposes are irrelevant, as is the
virtuousness or viciousness of either party's disposition. All that
matters for the interaction is that the particular purposes of the
interacting parties be expressions of purposive capacity.
This is not to deny, of course, that persons have particular
purposes; it would be senseless to think of a capacity unless it could be
exercised. Rather, the particular purposes are viewed as legally
significant only because they are expressions of this capacity. In the
natural right tradition of legal philosophy, this conception of the
capacity for purposiveness without regard to particular purposes is
known as personality. 38 Personality is to the actor what correlativity is
to the interaction: the most general normative conception immanent
in being a party to a private law relationship. Because personality is
the presupposition of correlativity, personality and correlativity are
complementary conceptions formulated from the perspective of the
actor and the interaction, respectively. 39
Because one person's exercise of this capacity can produce
effects on another, juridical relationships of doer and sufferer arise.
For the doer, this capacity for purposive action is the condition for the
ascription of responsibility for such effects, and thus for the duties
that private law imposes. For the sufferer, this capacity is the basis
for rights, which are nothing but the juridical manifestations either of
exercises of this capacity (as in the case of rights to property or
contractual performance) or of the physical organism in which it is
embodied (as in the case of the right to personal integrity). Because
private law is not concerned with particular purposes however
laudable, it imposes no positive duties. Instead, it anchors itself in the
rights of the plaintiff and imposes negative duties of non-interference
with those rights. This regime of rights and their correlative duties is
the juridical framework for each purposive being to act consistently
with the freedom of every other purposive being. In this way private
law holds the interaction of purposive beings to what is normatively
implicit in their capacity for purposiveness.
Personality illuminates the normative standpoint specific to
private law, including its mutually entailed conceptions of freedom
and equality. In articulating the juridical implications of the parties'
purposive capacity, private law treats the parties as endowed with
38. See HEGEL, supra note 9, §§ 34-40.
39. For a fuller treatment of the relationship between correlativity and personality, see
Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice,
in THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 107, 113-126 (2001).
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self-determining freedom. The regime of rights and correlative duties
is a system of negative freedom, with one's rights demarcating spheres
of freedom for the right-holder and limits on freedom for others.
Within this regime the parties are formal equals, because when they
are conceived as purposive beings without regard to their specific
purposes, the sources of substantive inequality, such as differentials
in wealth or virtue, become irrelevant. Thus the parties are equal, in
that they are both treated as the loci of self-determining freedom; and
they are free, in that neither is subordinated to the unilateral
purposiveness of the other. Seen in the light of this normative
standpoint, the practice of private law involves the continual
elaboration and refinement of how personality and its attendant
notions of freedom and equality figure in particular determinations of
liability.
It might be objected that, given their abstractness and
formality, these conceptions of freedom and equality are not very
robust or appealing. However, this objection, even if it were true, is
irrelevant. The issue is not whether these conceptions are appealing
but whether they are immanent in private law. Recall that the three
stages outlined here have been presented in order to specify the
character of legal practice. The point is not to work out the most
attractive conceptions of freedom or equality as if we were
constructing a utopia from the ground up, but to derive the most
general framework for understanding private law from the structure
and presuppositions of its legal relationships. If the progression from
the practice of private law to correlativity and then to personality is
sound, then the conceptions of freedom and equality that emerge are
those that are presupposed in the practice.
The understanding of private law elucidated through these
three stages differs sharply from the instrumentalist conception
discussed earlier. The instrumentalist conception starts by specifying
goals that are desirable apart from private law and then examines
private law in their light. As a consequence, the instrumentalist
misconstrues the law's concepts, cuts the direct relationship of the
parties, and subsumes private law under public law. Having started
outside private law, the instrumentalist does not succeed in re-
entering it. The result is a disjunction between instrumentalist
scholarship-including the kind of legal education it inspires-and the
legal practice that is its subject matter. In the elucidation of the
character of private law, no such disjunction appears. The process of
elucidation starts from within private law and then considers its legal
concepts on their own terms. The direct connection between plaintiff
and defendant, far from being the embarrassment that it is for the
instrumentalist, is the manifestation of the correlativity that
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structures the justifications for liability. In this conception, private
law is categorically different from public law. Private law can
therefore be understood as the juridical realization of a bipolar
normativity in which one purposive being is directly related to another
through a system of rights and their correlative duties.
When private law is understood in terms of its ideal character,
no disjunction exists between two of the three activities with which we
began, the practice of law and the enterprise of understanding that
practice. The two activities are continuous without being congruent.
They are continuous, because the understanding of law is elucidated
through reflection on the structure and presuppositions of the practice
of private law. They are not congruent, however, because the activity
of understanding private law requires a theoretical effort that works
out, according to its own methods and idiom, the most general
conceptual framework immanent in the practice. The ingredients of
that conception, correlativity and personality, deal with legal practice
in its own terms, but they are not themselves explicit in that practice.
Rather, they are the theoretical constructs that illuminate the
character of private law.
C. Legal Education
Turning now to the third of our initial three activities, one can
see why private law, understood in this way, is suitable for university
study. The purpose of university study is to care for the intellectual
inheritance of civilized life. Private law is a significant and distinctive
part of that inheritance. Private law is the ongoing attempt,
actualized through society's legal institutions, to submit the direct
interaction of one person with another to a system of reason. It
involves an immense collective intellectual effort carried out over
centuries and in different jurisdictions, featuring failures as well as
successes, mistaken diversions as well as majestic triumphs. Its
distinctiveness as a normative ordering lies in its correlative
structuring the parties' relationship, which makes the morality of
private law categorically different from that of either personal ethics
or political action. Private law is thus the forum for a special mode of
thinking, which it is the function of university to impart.
In the enterprise of legal education, the university study and
the professional training perform complementary functions, but each
has its own focus. Professional training produces familiarity with the
present operation of private law, developing skills based on particular
legal materials and suitable to particular demands. University study,
however, imparts (or should impart) a sense of the intelligibility of
private law as a whole. Its interest is not in particular legal materials
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but in the mode of thinking that has produced them. Or, more
accurately, its interest is in particular legal materials not for the
information that they convey but for their exemplification of
correlatively structured thinking, reasoning, and discourse.
As part of the university study of law, then, legal education is
the process by which students of the law are initiated into a world
composed of this correlatively structured mode of reasoning. Such
reasoning is something students learn by engaging in it, that is, by
being exposed to and discussing paradigms of it and by being provided
with opportunities to develop their skills at it. This requires serious
focus on legal doctrine not merely as a collection of rules or as a
checklist for lawyers' dealings with particular situations, but as the
crystallization of the distinctive mode of reasoning that directly links
the defendant's conduct to the plaintiffs entitlement.
Several facets of this engagement with the law are particularly
important. One is attention to the interrelation of the organizing
concepts within a given basis of liability, and to the question of
whether these concepts, as presented by the positive law, form a
coherent set, that is, whether they adequately realize the legal
relationship's correlative structure. Another is developing an
appreciation of the casuistic reasoning that gives those concepts
specific meaning in the rich variety of particular circumstances. A
third is the exploration of the relationship between content and
process, between the substantive considerations that justify liability,
and the adjudicative context in which these considerations are
assessed.
In this enterprise the theoretical constructs of correlativity and
personality play a background role. They bring to the surface the
character of the practice, so one can be aware of the nature of coherent
legal discourse. The practice, however, proceeds in its own terms. Just
as the practice of law carries on without explicit reference to these
constructs, so students must learn to formulate arguments about
liability without invoking them. The general conceptual structure of
private law cannot serve as a substitute for considering the legal
material itself. Correlativity and personality reflect the character of
private law reasoning in general, so far as that reasoning is coherent,
but it cannot generate a complete legal code to be mechanically
applied in particular cases. All that the theoretical constructs can do-
and it is enough that they do so-is orient us toward the requirements
of justificatory coherence, and thus assist in eliminating
considerations that are incompatible with it.40
40. On orientation as a role of theory, compare the remarks of John Rawls about political
philosophy:
[Vol. 60:2:401426
2007] CAN LAW SURVIVE LEGAL EDUCATION? 427
Because the ideas of correlativity and personality are general
and abstract, different systems of private law can manifest them in
different ways. Although correlativity and personality are the stable
theoretical constructs implicit in any regime of private law that values
and aspires to its own justificatory coherence, they can have a variable
content that is relative to a society's particular tradition of positive
law, to the history of its legal responses to given problems, to the
shared social understandings that obtain at a given time and place.
Accordingly, the comparative study of law across different
jurisdictions and historical periods has a natural place within this
conception of legal education.41 Because legal education so conceived
focuses on legal practice as a culture of justification, comparative
study involves the comparison not of differing legal doctrines across
systems, but of the justifications offered for differing doctrines, of the
conceptual structures into which such justifications fit, and of the
adequacy of these conceptual structures to the underlying ideas of
correlativity and personality. Such study can create awareness of the
possible latitude for actualizing the constructs of correlativity and
personality within legal practice, and thus of the particularities and
contingencies of one's own legal system. It also allows for an
appreciation of the persistence of correlativity and personality in the
structure of different legal systems, and thus of the existence of a
distinctive mode of normative reasoning that that transcends the
[Ilt belongs to reason and reflection (both theoretical and practical) to orient
us in the (conceptual) space, say, of all possible ends, individual and
associational, political and social. Political philosophy, as a work of reason,
does this by specifying principles to identify reasonable and rational ends,
and by showing how those ends can cohere within a well-articulated
conception of a just and reasonable society.
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 3 (2001). In this vein one might say with
respect to private law that legal theory orients us in the conceptual space of all possible
justifications for liability. It does this by specifying the constructs of correlativity and personality
in order to identify the appropriate kind of justifications and by showing how justifications of
that kind can cohere within a well-articulated conception of private law.
41. The importance of comparative legal studies has long been asserted, as is evident from
the following observations of James Bradley Thayer:
[Il]t has been wisely said that if a man would know any one thing, he must know more
than one. And so our system of law must be compared with others; its characteristics
only come out when this is done.... If any one would remind himself of the flood of light
that may come from such comparisons, let him recall the brilliant work of Pollock's
predecessor at Oxford, Sir Henry Maine, in his great book on Ancient Law. That is the
best use of Roman law for us, as a mirror to reflect light upon our own, a tool to unlock
its secrets....
Of the value of such comparative studies, and the immense power to lift
different subjects of our law into a clear and animating light, no competent person who
has once profited by them can ever doubt.
James Bradley Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARv. L. REV. 169, 177-
78 (1895).
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particularities of different systems of private law and that constitutes
the condition for the possibility of productive comparison among them.
Correlativity and personality can also move from the
background to the foreground. When this occurs, the focus shifts from
legal practice to legal philosophy. Correlativity and personality are
then used to connect private law as a normative phenomenon to the
corpus of legal and political philosophy. Particularly relevant is the
history of reflection about correlativity that begins with Aristotle's
treatment of corrective justice42 and culminates in the accounts of
natural right formulated by Kant and Hegel. 43 These texts can then
become the vehicle for considering further regressions from
personality as a presupposition of correlativity to what is presupposed
in the notion of personality itself. They thereby present an opportunity
to deepen one's understanding of private law by opening up a further
series of questions about its normative foundations, its relationship
with other kinds of normative phenomena, and its place within more
comprehensive philosophical systems.
What I have suggested in this Part with respect to private law
is a conception of legal education that remains rooted in the practice of
law while focusing on the most general conceptual framework implicit
in it. This conception is incompatible with the instrumental
approaches to law that now enjoy primacy. It replaces the
instrumentalist emphasis on independently justifiable goals with
attention to the internal structure of legal relations and to what must
be presupposed if legal relations are to be normatively coherent. Its
enquiry is internal in every respect. It is internal to the law in that it
purports to make sense of legal thinking in its own terms. In its focus
on coherence, it enquires into the internal relationship among the
components of an integrated justificatory structure. And in specifying
the character of private law, it identifies theoretical constructs that
are internally related to one another and to private law. It thereby
brings together the three activities of the practice, the understanding,
and the university study of private law, so that law can indeed survive
legal education.
IV. THE INTERDISCIPLINARY TURN
In this final Part, I explore the implications of this paper's
understanding of private law for interdisciplinary study. The rise of
interdisciplinary scholarship has been perhaps the most dramatic
development in legal education over the last generation. In place of
42. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V, 1131b25-1132b20 (2002).
43. HEGEL, supra note 9; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1996).
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the previous emphasis on cases and doctrine, a new paradigm of
scholarship and teaching has arisen, which brilliantly mobilizes the
insights of other disciplines-economics, literature, and philosophy
are among the favorites-to the analysis of legal material. Of course,
the use of these disciplines can be consistent with the character of
private law. In the previous Section I suggested that philosophical
issues readily emerge from the elucidation of this character, while
cautioning that these issues deal with the presuppositions of legal
discourse without being explicitly part of it. However, much of the
current interdisciplinary interest is not based on such elucidation of
the law's character, but is nonetheless rooted in the aspiration to
weave the study of law into the intellectual fabric of university life.
44
How does this kind of interdisciplinary work relate to legal education
that places the law's ideal character at its core?
The popularity of interdisciplinary scholarship is a natural
outgrowth of the instrumentalist approach to private law. As
evidenced by its cavalier treatment of the fundamental legal concepts,
the instrumentalist approach denies that the content of private law
arises indigenously in accordance with the correlative structure of its
legal relationships. Rather, the law is merely the passive receptacle of
whatever goals are to be imposed on it from the outside. The study of
law, accordingly, is not an autonomous body of learning, but an empty
shell dependent on non-legal disciplines for the validation of the
proposed goals. Hence the proliferation of rich interdisciplinary
interests in "Law and. . .," with the vital element in the pairing being
invariably the non-legal one. Law provides only the authoritative form
into which the conclusions of non-legal thinking are translated. Law is
considered to have no meaning except that which it absorbs from other
disciplines and enquiries. Indeed the capacity to funnel insights about
law so conceived through alien concepts and terminology is considered
the mark of scholarly detachment and sophistication.
The paradoxical consequence of this basis for interdisciplinary
scholarship is that the interdisciplinary turn is actually an illusion.
For academic work to be truly interdisciplinary, it must engage more
than one discipline. Law, however, is regarded not as a discipline in
its own right with something of its own to contribute to the
interdisciplinary enterprise, but merely as a context for projects from
other disciplines. The resulting study is nothing but the application of
a particular non-legal discipline to examples drawn from the law. The
economic analysis of law, for instance, then turns out to involve not an
enlarged study of law but a restricted study of economics. Given that
the legal side lacks intellectual resources of its own, what motivates
44. See MENACHEM MAUTNER, ON LEGAL EDUCATION (2002) (Hebrew).
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the interdisciplinary scholar is interest in the non-legal discipline. As
was once observed about the parallel phenomenon in literary studies,
[a] scholar with a special interest in... economics expresses that
interest by the rhetorical device of putting his favorite study into a
causal relationship with whatever interests him less. Such a method
gives one the illusion of explaining one's subject while studying it,
thus wasting no time.
45
The recognition that private law embodies a distinctive mode of
thinking is both a prerequisite of interdisciplinary work about private
law and a determinant of that work's nature. It is a prerequisite
because without it reference to the insights of another discipline is
reductive rather than interdisciplinary; the other discipline is invoked
to show that the law, at the most, reflects a deformed version of those
insights. It is a determinant of the nature of interdisciplinary work
because that work, of whatever kind it is, has to allow private law the
independent space entailed by that recognition. Interdisciplinary work
can then not be conceived as the construction of a repository of
homogeneous knowledge, because such homogeneity is inconsistent
with the distinctiveness of the legal mode of thinking. Rather,
knowledge has to be regarded as pluralistic, that is, as organized into
categorically different kinds of enquiry each of which (including the
study of law) has its distinct character.
Within the university law school, the point of interdisciplinary
study is to present different perspectives for the understanding of the
transactions governed by the law. Each of these perspectives has its
own validity, rests on its own presuppositions, and operates within its
own disciplinary boundaries. A medical misadventure, for example,
may raise not only issues of liability, but also issues of economics, of
sociology, of political science, of psychology, and so on. Within a law
school the legal perspective has of course a certain contextual primacy,
because, whatever else it does, a law school must impart to its
students a sense of the distinctiveness of the law as a mode of
normative discourse. This distinctiveness excludes other perspectives,
but does not deny their authority within their own spheres. Indeed,
exposure to these other perspectives plays an important role for the
study of law for several reasons. First, the very contrast between legal
and non-legal modes of enquiry casts light on the law's distinctive
structure and presuppositions (as the law does on theirs). Second, the
contrast reveals the place of law as an intellectual enterprise among
other such enterprises, and that civilized life requires the co-operation
and mutual respect of all of these. Third, an awareness of the contrast
induces an appreciation of the limits of law, and thus a proper sense of
45. NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 6 (1957).
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humility: although the law governs all of life, the person who is
learned in the law is not therefore omniscient.
Accordingly, one can view the interdisciplinary study of law as
creating an academic conversation with different disciplinary voices.
46
The object of this conversation is not to have one voice suppress any of
the others but to maintain the individuality of each. When every voice
contributes the insight that derives from its own distinctive activity,
the conversation can enlarge the understanding of its participants.
It is not always easy to maintain the line between respectful
attention to a different voice and hearing that voice as a deformed
version of one's own. Consider, for example, the most celebrated and
influential piece of interdisciplinary legal scholarship of the twentieth
century, Ronald Coase's treatment of social cost. 47 Coase's article deals
with what he calls "a technical problem of economic analysis '48
regarding the harmful effects of one's actions on others. In the
exposition of his analysis he uses classic court judgments dealing with
the law of private nuisance. It is worth pausing on how he views the
relationship between his economic argument and the judicial
illustrations.
On the one hand, Coase is admirably sensitive to the difference
between economic and legal analysis. The economic problem is how to
maximize the value of production. 49 The legal problem is how to
determine liability. Coase insists, rightly, that this difference should
not confuse economists about the nature of their problem.50 "The
reasoning employed by courts in determining legal rights," he
observes, "will often seem strange to an economist because many of
the factors on which the decision turns are to an economist
irrelevant."51 In deciding the economic problem, certain legal
considerations are "about as relevant as the colour of the judge's
eyes."52 Economists do one thing and judges do another. Therefore,
economists should not take their cue from how judges deal with the
external effects of the defendant's actions.
On the other hand, Coase does not think that the converse
obtains. Although the economists should not be influenced by the
judges, he thinks it desirable for judges, because their decisions
directly influence economic activity, to take the economic analysis into
46. For the metaphor of a conversation, see OAKESHOTT, supra note 1, at 195-96; MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT, THE VOICE OF LIBERAL LEARNING 109 (Liberty Fund Inc. 2001) (1989).
47. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
48. OAKESHOTT, supra note 1, at 1.
49. Id. at 15.
50. Id. at 9.




account. 53 His assumption is that although the economist's problem is
different from the judge's, the judge's problem is not all that different
from the economist's. He takes it for granted that the law of nuisance
has no character of its own beyond the influence it exerts on economic
activity, and that it therefore should be animated by properly
formulated economic considerations. Of course, qua economist Coase
has no reason to be alert to (let alone, to explore) the distinctiveness of
the legal mode of thinking in matters of private law. However, the
consequence of his justifiable preoccupation with his "technical
problem of economic analysis" 54 is that he reads the cases as
containing renditions, often inadequate, of the economic argument.
In Bryant v. Lefever, 55 for example, the defendants extended
upward the wall that ran beside the plaintiffs chimneys, with the
result that when the plaintiff lit a fire in any of his rooms, the smoke
could not clear but came back into the plaintiffs house. What attracts
Coase's attention is not the court's ultimate judgment in favor of the
defendant (in the absence, as here, of transactions costs, the parties
would bargain toward the efficient result whatever the court decided)
but rather the court's misapprehension of the causal relationship
between the parties' activities. In dismissing the plaintiffs claim, the
court held that, although the defendant's erection of the wall
materially interfered with the plaintiffs comfort and thus constituted
a nuisance, the nuisance was caused not by the defendant's act but by
the plaintiffs lighting of the fires. Criticizing this crucial element in
the court's analysis, Coase observes that it was "fairly clear" that both
parties caused the smoke nuisance, because "[g]iven the fires, there
would have been no smoke without the wall; given the wall, there
would have been no smoke without the fires."56 Accordingly, "both
were responsible and accordingly both should be forced to include the
loss of the amenity due to smoke as a cost of deciding whether to
continue the activity which gives rise to the smoke"--which in fact is
what would happen because of the possibility of costless bargaining.
The court made the mistake of assuming that the wall was "the given
factor,"57 thus transforming the parties' joint causation into the self-
infliction of harm by the plaintiff.
This criticism ignores the juridical quality of the court's
reasoning. The court's task is to determine liability within a system of
rights and correlative duties. These rights and duties establish the
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id. at 1.
55. Bryant v. Lefever, [1879] 4 C.P.D. 172 (Eng.).
56. Coase, supra note 47, at 13.
57. Id.
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baseline from which to determine the direction in which causation
moves. Causation is, accordingly, not a natural phenomenon that
reflects the fact that the smoke was the result of the combination of
the defendant's wall and the plaintiffs fire lighting. Nor is it an
economic conclusion geared to the maximization of the value of
production in accordance with what Coase calls "the beauties of a
smoothly operating pricing system."58 Rather, causation functions here
within an argument about the imputation of liability. Liability
requires that the defendants' action have been inconsistent with the
rights of the plaintiff and not merely the exercise of one of their own
rights. Here by extending the wall upwards, the defendants did
nothing but occupy the space that they owned. The legitimacy of
occupying space that one owns is inseparable from the right involved
in ownership. It therefore does not constitute a wrong that can be
imputed to the defendants. Moreover, because the plaintiffs harm was
the consequence of the smoke's failure to clear the defendants'
building, the plaintiff was wronged only if he had a right to the space
over the defendants' property required for clearance. That space,
however, belonged to the defendants and was not subject to any right
of way in favor of the plaintiff. Of course, the plaintiff was harmed by
the defendants' action in the sense that he was worse off than before
the wall was built. However, in view of the configuration of rights in
this situation, the plaintiff was not wronged.
One can sum up what is problematic about Coase's criticism of
the court as follows. For Coase the given factor in the court's analysis
was the wall, because the wall made what is properly a cause of the
smoke into a condition for ascribing causation only to the plaintiffs
lighting of the fire. From the court's perspective, however, it would be
more accurate to say that the given factor was not the wall itself, but
the right to build it. The court's assumption was simply that within a
coherent system of proprietary rights, one has the right to build on
one's own property. Instead of viewing the court's decision as
exemplifying a properly legal mode of analysis of the relationship
between owners of adjoining properties, Coase reads it as a
misstatement of the obviously reciprocal causation that should
underlie the economist's attitude toward the maximization of the
value of production.
Similar observations can be made about Coase's famous
treatment of Sturges v. Bridgman.5 9 The issue in that case was
whether activity by the defendant that would otherwise constitute a
nuisance escaped liability because it temporally preceded the use by
58. Id.
59. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852 (Eng.).
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the plaintiff with which it interfered. The defendant was a
confectioner who had been using the back section of his property for
decades as a kitchen in which he pounded his meats. No problem
arose as long as the adjoining property was used as a garden, because
the noise did not inconvenience anyone. The plaintiff, however, was a
physician who had recently built a consulting room on the site of the
garden, and complained that the noise of the pounding interfered with
his practice. The court held the defendant liable.
Coase singles out the court's statement that a different result
would "produce a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for
residential purposes."60 He points out that so long as market
transactions between the confectioner and the physician were costless,
the court's decision could have no effect on the allocation of resources.
If one party gained more from the continuation of his activity than the
other lost from the cessation of his, the party that stood to gain more
would strike a bargain that would allow him to continue even if he lost
his case. "The judges' view that they were settling how land was to be
used," Coase writes, "would be true only in the case in which the costs
of carrying out the necessary market transactions exceeded the gain
which might be achieved by any rearrangement of rights.... But of
this the judges seem to have been unaware." 6
1
Here, too, Coase is hearing in the court decision not the
distinctive voice of legal discourse but an inferior version of his own
economist's voice. Coase treats the court as attempting to achieve a
certain economic goal (the development of residential housing) in
ignorance of proper economic reasoning. If, however, one reads the
judgment as a whole and views the offending sentence in its light, a
different picture emerges. The court was concerned not with settling
how the land was to be used, but with determining the conditions
under which an action by the defendant could diminish a right of the
plaintiff. The court's focus was juridical, not economic.
For the court, the problem with the confectioner's position was
that it asserted a power unilaterally to restrict another's right. Under
the law of nuisance the plaintiff had a right to the use and enjoyment
of his property, but this right could not be vindicated in a court of law
so long as his use and enjoyment was unaffected. While the property
was being used as a garden, the physician (or his predecessor) had no
cause of action in nuisance, because the noise from the confectioner's
pounding did not inconvenience him. The confectioner's argument
once the physician built the consulting room was that the physician
had lost the right to complain of the nuisance. But how can one
60. Id. at 866.
61. Coase, supra note 47, at 10.
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person's right be extinguished by the unilateral acts of another? The
confectioner might argue that the long history of meat pounding
shows that the physician (or his predecessor) implicitly acquiesced in
the confectioner's acquisition of an easement. As the court pointed out,
however, one can acquiesce only in what one can prevent. Until the
physician suffered an inconvenience that allowed him to sue in
nuisance, he could not prevent the meat pounding, and therefore
cannot be taken to have acquiesced in it.
What, then, is the significance of the court's reference to "the
prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential
purposes," around which Coase's treatment of the case revolves? 62 The
comment comes after the court considered a hypothetical case, which
it rightly regarded as exactly analogical to the case at hand, of "a
blacksmith's forge built away from all habitations but to which, in the
course of time, habitations approach."6 3 The court disqualified two
possible treatments of this hypothetical case. On the one hand, it
would be unreasonable to extend liability for nuisance to the period
before the habitations approached because that would give the
adjoining landowners a right to sue for an inconvenience that they
have not yet, and may never, suffer. But, the court continued, "it
would be on the other hand in an equal degree unjust, and, from a
public point of view, inexpedient that the use and value of the joining
land should, for all time and under all circumstances, be restricted
and diminished by reason of the continuance of acts incapable of
physical interruption, and which the law gives no power to prevent."64
This is the sentiment that the subsequent remark about the
prejudicial effect on residential development encapsulates. It is not
that the court necessarily thinks that the growth of the habitations
mentioned in the hypothetical case is itself desirable: the court is not
attempting to settle land use for a hypothetical case. What is unjust
and inexpedient is that the owners of the land on which habitations
might arise should have their rights prejudiced by actions of the
blacksmith that they cannot physically interrupt or legally prevent.
The "prejudicial effect on the development of land for residential
purposes" is not that there will be too few residences, but that right of
the hypothetical landowners to develop residences protected by the
law of nuisance will be abridged by the blacksmith's unilateral
activity.
Both Bryant and Sturges are exemplary displays of the mode of
thinking distinctive to private law. Each case treats the alleged
62. Sturges, [1879] 11 Ch.D. at 866.




injustice as one to which the parties must be correlatively situated as
doer and sufferer. The doing and the suffering consist, respectively, in
the infringement, and in being the victim of the infringement, of the
right to use and enjoy one's property. This right represents a sphere of
lawful freedom with which others are obligated not to interfere. The
cases enquire into the meaning of this right in the specific
circumstances of building up and of pre-existing activity by the
defendant. In both cases the court's reasoning provides a sophisticated
elaboration in legal terms of the relationship between the plaintiffs
right and the defendant's action.
In contrast, Coase assumes that the courts are addressing
issues of economic rather than juridical thinking. He reads the
reference to causation in Bryant not as working out an imputation of
liability against the background of the parties' rights, but as
overlooking the obvious causal reciprocity that informs a proper
economic analysis. Similarly, he reads the reference to the prejudicial
effect on residential development in Sturges not as underlining the
illegitimacy of the defendant's unilaterally restricting the plaintiffs
right, but as failing to anticipate the bargaining that would take place
when transactions are costless. In each case the court was not making
an economic argument in ignorance of the economic consequences that
Coase describes; it was making a legal argument about the connection
between one person's rights and another person's will that Coase has
misapprehended.
This misapprehension, of course, does not mean that Coase's
brilliant article has no place in a university program of legal
education. To the contrary, it should have a place of great honor as a
masterful exhibition of the subtleties of the economic approach to
situations that have attracted the law's interest. Both law and
economics feature modes of thinking that present systematic and
comprehensive understandings of human interaction. In the nuisance
context economic thinking, as portrayed by Coase's analysis, is
concerned with harms and costs, whereas legal thinking is concerned
with rights and remedies. The contrast between these two modes of
thinking is not only a matter of genuine intellectual significance in its
own right, but also a considerable resource for imparting to students a
sense of the character of private law. For we often begin to understand
what something is by seeing what it is not.
If the interdisciplinary turn in legal education is to bear fruit,
it must be supposed that law has an independent voice that can
contribute to the conversation among the university's disciplines.
Whatever else it does, legal education is charged with the task of
inculcating in students the capacity to speak in this voice and to
understand its distinctive character. In the conversation among
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disciplines this voice is juxtaposed against other voices, so that the
significance of each-its presuppositions, its organizing structures, its
way of relating to the particulars of the world that all share-can be
better appreciated. The idea of a conversation is not that one voice
replaces or silences or dominates the others, but that each puts forth
the ideas appropriate to it, humble in the awareness of its own limits
and respectful of distinctiveness of others. For in a conversation, "[i]ts
integration is not superimposed but springs from the quality of the
voices which speak, and its value lies in the relics it leaves behind in
the minds of those who participate."
65
V. CONCLUSION
The central theme of this Article has been that private law is
animated by a distinctive mode of thinking and discourse, marked by
the structure of correlativity and informed by the presupposition of
personality. Accordingly, with respect to private law, the university
study of law, whatever else it does, has the task of engaging the
student in this mode of thinking and discourse. The disjunction that
critics of legal education have noted between university study and
legal practice is the consequence of understanding law in instrumental
terms and thereby obscuring the law's distinctive character. One
overcomes this disjunction by attending to the role of correlativity and
personality in an understanding of private law that is faithful to the
law's conception of itself as a normative phenomenon that strives for
justificatory coherence in the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant.
That law embodies a distinctive mode of thinking and discourse
is a venerable idea. One recalls Coke's response to the assertion by
James I that, because the law was founded upon reason, he as a
person endowed with reason was as qualified to sit in judgment as
were the judges. Coke replied with a ringing affirmation of the
distinctiveness of reason in the legal context:
[True it was that, God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science and great
endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of
England, and causes.., are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial
reason and judgment of the law, which law is an art which requires long study and
experience, before that a man can attain to cognizance of it.
6 6
In the modern context universities have the responsibility of
beginning the process of "long study and experience" that imparts
"cognizance" of this "artificial reason and judgment." This is a
65. OAKESHOTT, supra note 46, at 110.
66. Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B.).
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responsibility in which recognition of the law's distinctive character
converges with the university's calling to care for law as one of
civilization's pre-eminent achievements.
